weapons-grade

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Related to Weapons-grade uranium: Weapons grade plutonium

weapons-grade

adj
1. (Nuclear Physics) of suitable quality for making nuclear weapons
2. (Military) of suitable quality for making nuclear weapons
ThesaurusAntonymsRelated WordsSynonymsLegend:
Adj.1.weapons-grade - of a quality adequate for use in weapons (especially in weapons of mass destruction); "weapons-grade plutonium"; "weapons-grade anthrax"
superior - of high or superior quality or performance; "superior wisdom derived from experience"; "superior math students"
2.weapons-grade - extremely strong or concentrated or durable; "industrial-strength detergent"; "weapons-grade salsa"
strong - having strength or power greater than average or expected; "a strong radio signal"; "strong medicine"; "a strong man"
Translations

weapons-grade

adj weapons-grade plutonium/uraniumwaffenfähiges Plutonium/Uran
References in periodicals archive ?
In its turn, Tehran repeatedly denied that the Fordow facility was intended to produce weapons-grade uranium, saying that it was tasked only with producing low-enriched uranium for power plants.
Once a country enriches uranium to around 20%, scientists say the time needed to reach the 90% threshold for weapons-grade uranium is halved.
President Barack Obama, which restricted the country from enriching weapons-grade uranium.
Imagine if Iran's leaders were only months or even weeks away from laying their hands on enough weapons-grade uranium for a nuclear bomb?
Weapons-grade uranium has an enrichment level of around 90 percent.
In 1942, as part of Britain's highly secretive Operation Tube Alloys project, work into producing weapons-grade uranium with atomic potential started there.
LEU can be purified into highly enriched, weapons-grade uranium.
Experts explained to Reuters that "if the total amount of LEU Iran possesses is unknown, it is impossible to know how much weapons-grade uranium it could yield." The think tank has previously calculated that, without the exemptions, Iran's breakout time to a nuclear weapon would be seven months in the first decade of the deal and four months by year 13.
But the deal would appear to also permit Iran to keep large amounts of enriched uranium in solid form (as opposed to gas), which could be reconverted to gas within weeks, thus providing a substantial head-start to producing weapons-grade uranium.
But many countries fear Iran could use the technology to make weapons-grade uranium.
Netanyahu believes that the break-out time for producing weapons-grade uranium will inevitably be too short--indeed, less than the year President Obama speaks about--and that inspections of the Iranian program will necessarily be too limited and, in any case, promise no action in the face of violations.