(2) As exemplified by the acratic, it is possible for one to know what the good or the right requires and still fail to act on it.
The Republic tyrant is not an acratic; he is vicious.
At that moment, the acratic identifies himself as the agent who desires to gaze; the encratic would be the one who at that moment identifies himself as the agent whose good is achieved by not gazing.
The acratic is caught between the two "men," external and internal, seemingly identifying with both at once.
According to my interpretation, there is rationality on both sides of the acratic's internal debate.
Irwin, Plato's Ethics (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 209-11 on "good-independent" desires, which are desires "independent of beliefs about the good." Of course, the appetites must be independent of some beliefs about the good--those of the calculative part of the soul--if they are to be the source of acratic action.
One thing was certain, though, and that was--all the techniques of philological and verbal, to say nothing of rational, skill I had learned over the years were as nothing compared to the techne of encratic and acratic
sociolects, of transgressive sememes, hegemonic signifiers, and endoxal deviance.