Francisco Suarez on Metaphysics of Modality: An
Actualist and Essentialist View on Real Possible Beings, ILARIA ACQUAVTVA
This principle is violated by "
actualist" theories.
First, Peterson's
actualist theory values optimal outcomes above everything else, which means that it is maximisation-dominated; and second, Peterson's theory gives us a particular understanding of incomparable sets of degrees of rightness, which in conjunction with the adoption of weighted randomisation as a decision-making procedure, renders Peterson's theory less informative and action-guiding than it could be.
Here is Livingston describing his view in his own words in the preface to his book: "I distinguish between different lines of argumentation that can be given in support of a partial,
actualist [sic] intentionalism, opting for an axiological approach that refers to the kind of artistic value involved in the skilful realization of intentions" (2005, xiii; emphasis added).
This kind of
actualist or vitalist model will find it difficult, of course, to deal with the traditional areas of conflict.
It was a spoof written by the
Actualist Poets of Iowa City about 40 years ago.
I argue that the strict
actualist requirements of his account permit a wide range of true negative causal claims.
In part because the authors do not wish to prejudge any metaphysical disputes--in particular they do not want to take a stand on whether one ought to be a possibilist rather than an
actualist, or an eternalist rather than a presentist--they scrupulously offer very careful explications of current
actualist and possibilist modal semantics as well as eternalist and presentist tense semantics.
This means that the model-theoretical version of reality is neither an
actualist nor a modal-realist one.
Actualist accounts of chance fail to explain the normative role of chance unless they adopt an implausible anthropocentrism.
There is a certain sense in which it is straightforward for an
actualist to gire an adequate Kripke-semantics for modal sentences.