actualist


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actualist

(ˈæktʃʊəlɪst)
n
a person who deals in hard facts; a realist
Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged, 12th Edition 2014 © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2014
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Francisco Suarez on Metaphysics of Modality: An Actualist and Essentialist View on Real Possible Beings, ILARIA ACQUAVTVA
This principle is violated by "actualist" theories.
First, Peterson's actualist theory values optimal outcomes above everything else, which means that it is maximisation-dominated; and second, Peterson's theory gives us a particular understanding of incomparable sets of degrees of rightness, which in conjunction with the adoption of weighted randomisation as a decision-making procedure, renders Peterson's theory less informative and action-guiding than it could be.
Here is Livingston describing his view in his own words in the preface to his book: "I distinguish between different lines of argumentation that can be given in support of a partial, actualist [sic] intentionalism, opting for an axiological approach that refers to the kind of artistic value involved in the skilful realization of intentions" (2005, xiii; emphasis added).
This kind of actualist or vitalist model will find it difficult, of course, to deal with the traditional areas of conflict.
It was a spoof written by the Actualist Poets of Iowa City about 40 years ago.
I argue that the strict actualist requirements of his account permit a wide range of true negative causal claims.
In part because the authors do not wish to prejudge any metaphysical disputes--in particular they do not want to take a stand on whether one ought to be a possibilist rather than an actualist, or an eternalist rather than a presentist--they scrupulously offer very careful explications of current actualist and possibilist modal semantics as well as eternalist and presentist tense semantics.
This means that the model-theoretical version of reality is neither an actualist nor a modal-realist one.
Actualist accounts of chance fail to explain the normative role of chance unless they adopt an implausible anthropocentrism.
There is a certain sense in which it is straightforward for an actualist to gire an adequate Kripke-semantics for modal sentences.