anomalous monism


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anomalous monism

n
(Philosophy) the philosophical doctrine that although all mental states consist merely in states of the brain, there exist no regular correspondences between classes of mental and physical states, and so no psychophysical laws. See also identity theory
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Chapter six discusses Davidson's Anomalous Monism, his conception of the relation between the mental and the physical.
In 'Can Supervenience and "Non-Strict Laws" Save Anomalous Monism', Kim argues that Donald Davidson's anomalous monism faces the so-called quausal problem.
Among their topics are vagueness and truth, anomalous monism, mathematical Platonism, creeping minimalism and the nature of minimal entities, reflections on the gem, and truthmakers for what?
Thus, like Davidson's claim of anomalous monism in the secondary sciences, Van Brakel's is open to the charge that the descriptive categories he is accepting as legitimate for capturing chemical phenomena are overly narrow.
Cooper examines dualism, identity theory, functionalism and anomalous monism and concludes that most psychiatric explanation is largely independent of these theories.
Campbell moves beyond Davidson as he defines the problem of mental causation and its relation to anomalous monism, the basic objections to anomalous monism, the causal relevance objection, the accidental connection and exclusion arguments, explanatory pluralism, and its extension to exclusion and epiphenomenalism.
The volume is organized around four topics: Truth, Language, Anomalous Monism, and Historical Thoughts.
In the two essays in this section Davidson defends his anomalous monism against a criticism and in doing so clarifies how he uses the concepts of causality, law (physical and psycho-physical), and supervenience.
Hornsby's antiphysicalism is greatly influenced by Davidson's anomalous monism.
This view is arrived at by showing that although anomalous monism does not entail type epiphenomenalism (despite what many of Davidson's critics have suggested), it does (when coupled with some additional claims) lead to the conclusion that the identification of A's reasons does not causally explain A's behavior.
This paper argues that Epicurus held a noureductionist view of mental states that is in the spirit of Davidson's anomalous monism.
Della Rocca spends some time in showing that such conception or description relativity is not to be equated with Davidson's anomalous monism.

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