anomalous monism


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anomalous monism

n
(Philosophy) the philosophical doctrine that although all mental states consist merely in states of the brain, there exist no regular correspondences between classes of mental and physical states, and so no psychophysical laws. See also identity theory
Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged, 12th Edition 2014 © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2014
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Chapter six discusses Davidson's Anomalous Monism, his conception of the relation between the mental and the physical.
In 'Can Supervenience and "Non-Strict Laws" Save Anomalous Monism', Kim argues that Donald Davidson's anomalous monism faces the so-called quausal problem.
Among their topics are vagueness and truth, anomalous monism, mathematical Platonism, creeping minimalism and the nature of minimal entities, reflections on the gem, and truthmakers for what?
Functionalism and anomalous monism. In: LePore E, McLaughlin BP, eds.
Finally, in a conclusion that is sure to invite interest from philosophers, Van Brakel claims that the appropriate "metaphysical model" to understand the relationship between physics and chemistry is one of "anomalous monism."
Taliaferro's dualism is ably, modestly, and convincingly defended against a very wide range of materialist opponents (although not Davidson's 'anomalous monism').
Cooper examines dualism, identity theory, functionalism and anomalous monism and concludes that most psychiatric explanation is largely independent of these theories.
Campbell moves beyond Davidson as he defines the problem of mental causation and its relation to anomalous monism, the basic objections to anomalous monism, the causal relevance objection, the accidental connection and exclusion arguments, explanatory pluralism, and its extension to exclusion and epiphenomenalism.
The volume is organized around four topics: Truth, Language, Anomalous Monism, and Historical Thoughts.
Hornsby's antiphysicalism is greatly influenced by Davidson's anomalous monism. Like Davidson, she thinks that the normative and first-personish aspects of common sense psychology preclude its reduction to physics.
Lombardo mentions Davidson's hypothesis of an "anomalous monism" that considers mental events identical with physical events, whereby, however, mental properties are not reducible to physical properties, because the domain of intentional phenomena cannot be described as a closed system within which one can be certain (provided one had a perfect science) that to a given mental event a physical event will necessary follow, for instance a behavioral response (p.
This view is arrived at by showing that although anomalous monism does not entail type epiphenomenalism (despite what many of Davidson's critics have suggested), it does (when coupled with some additional claims) lead to the conclusion that the identification of A's reasons does not causally explain A's behavior.

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