antirealism

antirealism

(ˌæntɪˈrɪəlɪzəm)
n
the denial of an objective reality
Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged, 12th Edition 2014 © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2014
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MUMPS thus allows for a more nuanced understanding of linguistic usage, change, and variation, without imposing a commitment to any form of metaphysical antirealism.
The Taming of the True continues the project Neil Tennant began in Antirealism and Logic (1987) of investigating and defending anti-realism.
(C) In the final part of the book, Skorupski attempts to carte out an approach somewhere between contemporary realism and antirealism about the normative, which he also calls an "irrealist" view.
Part of Chihara's book is a critical discussion of some of these menu options: Lewis's modal realism, Alvin Plantinga's abstract modal realism, Graeme Forbes's antirealism and Gideon Rosen's modal fictionalism.
Etienne Gilson, in his little gem Methodical Realism, observes that modern skepticism or antirealism (the denial of Aristotelian sense realism) as a historical novelty and event is a curiosity worth studying.
He tackles the viability of conditional analyses, what he sees as the attending question of realism versus antirealism, the dispositional/categorical distinction, the relationship between a disposition and its categorical base, laws of nature, and the threat of overdetermination stemming from the causal efficacy of both a disposition and its categorical base.
In addition, the author here expounds his own position in the debate on realism versus antirealism. Norris shows that the antirealist stance is not able to rebut skepticism, in spite of some recent well-intended attempts to do that.
One quite reasonable line he sometimes suggests (for example at 170-71, 195) is that the argument is important at least in showing the untenability of views like Gibbard's and Rorty's, views according to which noncognitivism or antirealism is perfectly psychologically compatible with commitment.
In this manner Contre-jour manages to be a triumph of human psychology while, at the same time, it constitutes a climax of irreality or antirealism in the formal realm.
When considering criterial vagueness, balancing the edicts of determinately ranked constitutive criteria, or weighing the criteria themselves, there is no good reason to move from vagueness to antirealism. The implausibility of radicalism and the know-nothing view provides further reason to follow appearances and allow the compatibility.
Structural realism is seen as a way of bypassing the traditional debate in the philosophy of science between realism and antirealism. Realists have insisted that scientific theories are offered as describing the world as it really is.
One weak argument by Kvanvig, for example, directed at Neil Tennant's defence of intuitionism and antirealism, is basically that standard logic cannot be given up as meta-theory since otherwise no debate about different logics will be possible.