porcupine provision

(redirected from antitakeover measure)
Also found in: Thesaurus, Financial.
ThesaurusAntonymsRelated WordsSynonymsLegend:
Noun1.porcupine provision - a measure undertaken by a corporation to discourage unwanted takeover attempts
measure, step - any maneuver made as part of progress toward a goal; "the situation called for strong measures"; "the police took steps to reduce crime"
golden parachute - giving top executives lucrative benefits that must be paid by the acquirer if they are discharged after a takeover
greenmail - (corporation) the practice of purchasing enough shares in a firm to threaten a takeover and thereby forcing the owners to buy those shares back at a premium in order to stay in business
pac-man strategy - the target company defends itself by threatening to take over its acquirer
poison pill - the target company defends itself by making its stock less attractive to an acquirer
safe harbor - the target company defends itself by acquiring a company so onerously regulated that it makes the target less attractive; "the acquisition gave the company a safe harbor"
scorched-earth policy - the target company defends itself by selling off its crown jewels
Based on WordNet 3.0, Farlex clipart collection. © 2003-2012 Princeton University, Farlex Inc.
References in periodicals archive ?
The company is continuing to explore a range of strategic options, and the plan is not intended to be an antitakeover measure or to deter offers that are fair and otherwise in the best interests of Aceto's stockholders.
as an antitakeover measure in light of global realignment in the industry since around 2000, but their share prices have fallen recently amid a deterioration in the balance of global steel supply and demand.
Whether or not an antitakeover measure is in place when a bid is contemplated may not be particularly important to the raider since managers can implement antitakeover devices such as poison pills relatively quickly.
Several researchers have investigated the possibility that other corporate governance factors such as stock ownership structure and board composition may help to determine the likelihood that a firm will adopt an antitakeover measure, such as a poison pill or antitakeover amendment, and the extent to which such measures will impact the firm.
Originally conceived as an antitakeover measure, the practice of electing only a third of the board each year, to serve for three years, puts a closer focus on the performance of those up for reelection and permits the CEO to engineer a change or two in the slate without seeming to threaten the board as a whole.
(2009) entrenchment index, which consists of the six most effective antitakeover measures. Finally, we also include board size and the percentage of independents on the board.
William Schwert, Poison or Placebo?: Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures, 39 J.
(307) See Coates, supra note 6, at 291-97, 306-10, 328-36 (providing evidence that pill adoptions do not affect bids, that poison pills do not correlate with other firm traits, and that certain other antitakeover measures have not been shown to affect bids).
Rights agreements are popular antitakeover measures, but the price at which the shareholder may purchase additional shares in the case of a takeover is usually set below or close to the market price.
William Schwert, "Poison or Placebo Evidence on the Deterrence and Wealth Effects of Modern Antitakeover Measures" (1995) 39 J.
Whether the topic is executive compensation, majority voting for directors, or antitakeover measures, the influence of shareholders on corporate policymaking is definitely on the rise.
While the existing literature reports conflicting findings concerning the relationship between the inside/outside director dichotomy and the adoption of antitakeover measures, consistent with agency theory we propose: