One difficulty is the tendency to theorise and estimate within EUT, axiomatised expected utility theory.
They had sought to develop a decision theory broader than EUT, axiomatised expected utility theory, so as to include anticipated thrills, fears and so forth.
Besides even if at some higher level of aggregation, the world were ergodic, it is far too complex for us to maximize an expectation in the sort of objective impartial overview manner postulated under EUT, axiomatised expected utility theory.
But, any physical theory that appeals to the real number continuum cannot be formally axiomatised
in the language of first order logic.
And few concessions are made to the reader's possibly imperfect knowledge of modern axiomatised economic theory or the mathematical theories from which it arose.
Such a methodology is a natural complement to fully axiomatised choice theory precisely because the concepts of such a theory are so abstract and therefore capable of many concrete applications.
I think that a lesson of the paradoxes is that we must go to an axiomatised truth theory rather than defining "true", even inductively.
But this doesn't undermine the point intended in the text: for one might well demand (more or less in the spirit of Tarski or at least Davidson) that an axiomatised truth theory be built around explicit compositional axioms like "A disjunction is true if and only if at least one disjunct is true".