emotivism


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emotivism

(ɪˈməʊtɪˌvɪzəm)
n
(Philosophy) ethics the theory that moral utterances do not have a truth value but express the feelings of the speaker, so that murder is wrong is equivalent to down with murder. Also called: boo-hurrah theory Compare prescriptivism, descriptivism
References in periodicals archive ?
This--and not the standard claim of emotivism, which he denied--is what links Rothko to Romanticism.
2007) (criticizing emotivism and utilitarianism's individualistic ethical thrust, and emphasizing the importance of a common good for a community that wishes to maintain meaningful social relationships and discourses).
Statistical analysis can be very helpful in avoiding purely individualistic arguments and emotivism. Looking at aggregate data can highlight trends and patterns otherwise invisible to normal observation.
(In ethics or, rather, meta-ethics, as I will indicate shortly, this came to be called the school of emotivism.)
The above positions which are central to Sartre's position presents Sartre's ethics as a version of "emotivism" or "prescriptivism" according to which judgment of value are essentially expressive or prescriptive and not descriptive (Baldwin 290).
Indeed, while the world of professional philosophy was increasingly dominated by various forms of positivism that combined a commitment to scientific reason with some type of moral emotivism, in popular culture the idea of "a higher moral order" accessible to the human mind was beginning to lose ground to "moral relativism" (46).
Ross stood fast on this view in his later and more illustrious monographs On law and justice (1958) where in some places he discussed justice from the viewpoint of emotivism characterizing justice as emotional expression (31), and Directives and Norms (1968) where in mapping what types of basic positions in moral philosophy are commonly-held, he explicitely stated his commitment to the meta-ethical view of emotivism (32).
First, it now becomes possible to give an account of why emotivism has become so popular in philosophy of religion.
(32.) See also David Carr (1997), who offers a sympathetic, non-Wittgensteinian view of Best and McFee on their handling of dance as integrated practices rather than sets of movements, but who takes issue with their attempt to inflate its rational element in defence against emotivism, subjectivity and scepticism.
Stevenson who insisted that moral approval or disapproval was merely an expression of a more general emotional state of approval or disapproval, but once again there was no specifically prescriptive version of emotivism that was offered.