illocution


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illocution

(ˌɪləˈkjuːʃən)
n
(Philosophy) philosophy an act performed by a speaker by virtue of uttering certain words, as for example the acts of promising or of threatening. Also called: illocutionary act See also performative Compare perlocution
[C20: from il- + locution]
ˌilloˈcutionary adj
Translations
Illokution
illocution
발화
illocutie
References in periodicals archive ?
This occurs when readers consider intentions relevant to deciding which locution, illocution, or even perlocution is intrinsic to a work, and hence consider them relevant to specifying what the work is.
They question what new illocutory and perlocutory effects (let me switch from Wittgenstein to Austin) an "art" illocution produces; and (back to Wittgenstein) what the new social and conceptual results of that discursive change may be.
That is, I classified the explanations according to their locution as opposed to their illocution (Austin 1962).
Which locution or illocution, if any, or what perlocutionary force would be able to convey the meaning of this locus?
Rushdie's text equally, of course, provides a concise refutation of Austin's own belief that considerations arising from speech-act theory and the significance of contextualization for meaning and illocution had no place in literature, or literary analysis.
The secondary layer, which handles the connotative or symbolic level of meaning (Adeyanju, 2011), deals with indirect speech acts- utterances in which one says one thing and means another; or says one thing and means what one says and also means another illocution with a different propositional content (Adegbija, 1982:32).
In natural language voice alters aboutness, radically so by ironic illocution. I suggest that aboutness and voice are two essential features of language which are likely to have been inherited from its nonverbal precursor systems.
Every utterance carries an illocutionary force, which enables it to perform an illocution; the relationship between an utterance and an illocution is equated by the production of locutive material- or linguistic content - concurrent with the completion of a speech act.
This volume explores "use-conditional meaning." It purports to follow "empirical and theoretical studies of expression whose meaning falls outside standard realm of truth-conditional semantics." The nine essays give the truth about lies, including an introduction to varieties of use-conditional meaning, German non-inflectional constructions as separate performatives, modal particles and context shift, discourse particles and common ground (and felicity conditions), expressive mean free datives and F-implications, good reasons (for conventional implication), common ground management through modal particles, illocution, biased polar questions in English and Japanese, and expressing surprise in particles.
The LCM is focused on the study of the relationship between syntax and all aspects of meaning construction, positing four descriptive levels, which deal with argument structure, implicated meaning, illocution and discourse phenomena.
Austin distinguishes between "locution" (the act of saying something), "illocution" (the act carried out in the act of saying), and "perlocution" (the effects of these acts).
1-12) provides an overview of the problem; a discussion of "oaths as speech acts," in which Austin's distinction between locution and illocution is probed along with linguists' differentiation between the "use" and "mention" of utterances; a discussion of "the general structure of oaths," stressing Searle's distinction between the authenticating element (the authenticator) and the content of the oath itself, as well as oaths' tendency towards ellipsis; a review of scholarship on BH oaths; and a short precis to the remainder of the study.