intensional object

intensional object

n
(Logic) logic philosophy the object of a propositional attitude that may or may not exist, as in Robert is dreaming of the pot of gold at the end of the rainbow. This must be an intensional (or opaque) context, for otherwise, since there is no pot of gold, Robert would be dreaming of nothing
Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged, 12th Edition 2014 © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2014
References in periodicals archive ?
Intensional Objects? A good deal of philosophical trouble has been occasioned by confusing the verbally or mentally intended reference to an object with an intensional object.
(19) But Brentano's followers were not always so cautious, and Alexius Meinong, for one, endowed intensional objects with a distinctly problematic objectivity.
It leads Perry to think of the self as a kind of intensional object, which guides the body, and which only the agent can have knowledge of; whereas, as we shall see, the only relevant object around is John Perry, i.e.
For, through discriminating between referential and attributive forms of speech, we shall find not only beliefs about Georgia but also beliefs about the self are not about intensional objects in the way the tradition thinks.
A Concept is thought of as representing an intensional object, and no Concepts are used to represent directly extensional (world) objects." Generic Concepts represent classes of individuals by describing prototypical members of the class and Individual Concepts are represented by relationships with more general Concepts.
Another recent relevant work is presented by I-logic in [5], which combines both approach to semantics of intensional objects of Montague and Fitting.
Intensional objects, such as propositions, meanings, synonymies, and so on, fail the criterion of identity (meanings in particular fail to have identity criteria).
Truth theories, being extensional, would seem to have difficulties handling such intensional objects. Not so, according to L and L, for we have to keep in mind that the axioms of a compositional meaning theory will be interpretive.
However, those who are sceptical about the knowledge of intensional objects need to be told more than (in effect) "if you (implicitly) accepted intensional objects in other areas you cannot object to their use here."