intensionality


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intensionality

(ɪnˌtɛnʃəˈnælɪtɪ)
n
(Logic) logic the state of being intensional
References in periodicals archive ?
There is also a traditional logical approach to Types in connection with the idea of intensionality, as in Kreidler (1998: 132): "the extension of a lexeme is the set of entities which it denotes (...) the intension of any lexeme is the set of properties shared by all members of the extension.".
Except in the fields of science and mathematics, our present way of thinking based on identification, allness, elementalism, and intensionality has been institutionalized--accepted as the norm, and formally maintained, promoted, and protected by our institutions and societies at large.
(2012), "Representing Unicorns: How to Think about Intensionality," in Currie, G., Kotatko, P.
Intensionality in the irrational beliefs-intellectual performance relationship.
Reads seems to consider the intensionality of (A) as its advantage, but it is a very dubious view.
This homomorphic diagram formally expresses the fusion of Frege's and Russell's semantics [27-29] of meaning and denotation of the FOL language and renders mathematically correct the definition of what we call an "intuitive notion of intensionality," in terms of which a language is intensional if denotation is distinguished from sense: that is, if both denotation and sense are ascribed to its expressions.
(5) For examples of sources in linguistics discussing intensionality, see GENNARO CHIERCHIA & SALLY MCCONNELL-GINET, MEANING AND GRAMMAR: AN INTRODUCTION TO SEMANTICS 257-328 (2d ed.
And even if, as does Dag Fallesdal, we were to regard Husserl's meanings as 'intensional entities', like Frege's Sinne, intensionality itself 'derives from intentionality'.
"Intensionality and Identity in Human Action and Philosophical Method." Nous, v.
Whether or not Parsons's (redirected) criticism succeeds depends, say Oppenheimer and Zalta, "on one's analysis of the intentionality of directed mental states and the intensionality of denoting phrases." (33) Although Anselm has views on these matters, Zalta and Oppenheimer do not pursue the matter.
The challenge of 'the intensionality of selection-for' (xviii), simply put, is whether a claim that gene A was selected for (in contrast to variant allele B) can be expressed in terms of physical causes without either invoking intentions, hence intensional language, or 'laws of selection' supporting counterfactual conditionals.
This distinction was revisited in one of the 2008 presentations, which observed that accepting a philosophical thesis of epiphenomenalism sets aside intensionality worries that the distinction presumes.