liar paradox


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liar paradox

n
(Logic) logic the paradox that this statement is false is true only if it is false and false only if it is true: attributed to Epimenides the Cretan in the form all Cretans are liars
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In sections on ancient, medieval, modern, and contemporary philosophy, he discusses the flux, the learner's paradox, the liar paradox, the problem of evil, the ontological argument, science and religion, Cartesian doubt, psychological egoism, free will and determinism, perception and justification, selfhood and computers, and Curry's paradox.
Examples include the liar paradox, Zeno's paradoxes, the travelling salesman problem, Turing's halting problem, Godel's incompleteness theorem, and Schrodinger's cat.
We show that the cause of prior problems was with ambiguous definition, as it was in the case of the liar paradox.
In Houben (1995a, 382) it is even claimed that Bhartrhari "provides us with the key to an interesting and elegant solution" to the family of paradoxes to which the Liar Paradox belongs.
At first, let me remind Lesniewski's-Tarski's diagnosis of the Liar paradox.
The Liar Paradox (which for him is "the so-called liar paradox") can be addressed without any metalinguistic maneuvering simply by saying, with Jean Buridan, that the utterer of a Liar Sentence is speaking falsely.
Godel realised he would need to formally express the concept of truth for number theoretical sentences in the language of number theory itself, but if he could do that, he would be able to produce a form of the Liar Paradox (a statement that asserts its own falsity, e.
7) In fact, this approach to solving the liar paradox is no longer very popular.
The liar paradox, (6) as the sentence is known, is puzzling because if it is true, then it must be giving an accurate description of itself, and must therefore be false.
The liar paradox is significant because it reveals the limits of rational discourse and the nature of the relation between reality and fiction.
The Liar paradox figures prominently in this collection, but is not alone.
What happens to the dialethic solution of the liar paradox if one stipulates that "true" and "untrue" determine complementary and thereby disjoint sets (Sainsbury 1995, p.