mentalese


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men·tal·ese

 (mĕn′tl-ēz′, -lēs′)
n.
A hypothetical language in which concepts and propositions are represented in the mind without words.

mentalese

(ˌmɛntəlˈiːz)
n
(Philosophy) a hypothetical mental system, resembling language, in which concepts can be pictured and combined without the use of words
References in periodicals archive ?
For when Steven Pinker claims that the imagery of "Kubla Khan" represents a kind of "mentalese" prior to language use proper, insofar as scientists and artists "alike think in images," (41) he is quite correct--except that sound, rather than image, would have better suited the case at hand.
The Elm and the Expert: Mentalese and Its Semantics.
Indeed, there is a burgeoning community of QM scholars who describe mind in math terms, using as mentalese adjuncts only the necessary vocabulary of observation in QM.
criticisms of his commitment to private Mentalese items, Fodor makes a
Processing information and representation involves manipulating symbols, which can form the language of thought, or mentalese (Fodor, 1975).
Whether or not the neo-Gricean is correct that p-meaning can be defined in terms of t-meaning and then t-meaning defined in terms of the causal-functional roles of mentalese expressions, it is apt to seem obvious that separate accounts are needed of p-meaning and t-meaning, since p-meaning, unlike t-meaning, must be understood at least partly in terms of communication.
Pinker (1995) called it mentalese and defined it in the glossary of his book as follows: "The hypothetical language of thought, or representation of concepts and propositions in the brain, in which ideas, including the meanings of words and sentences, are couched." Without mentioning Pinker's other assumptions, like the innate origin of mentalese, which could be tracked back to our genes (!), a problem arises when looking for empirical facts to back such theses.
Coordination in Mentalese. Coordinating constructions, ed.
Relying on (mentalese) concept language and its grammar, the authors harness the compositionality of the representational systems to develop a richer model of concept learning.
The recent focus by Dretske, Fodor, Pinker, and others, on a semantics for mentalese exists along side followers of Grice, who focus on the role speaker intent plays in determining the meaning of natural language.
In the process of expanding outward from the logic of reproduction to the explanation of cognitive mechanisms, evolutionary social scientists have already given concentrated attention to many of the standard topics in cognitive psychology, for instance, to "folk physics," "folk biology," and "folk psychology"; perceptual mechanisms; the relation between "modularized" cognitive processes and "general intelligence"; the relation between emotions and conscious decision-making; mirror neurons, "perspective taking," "Theory of Mind," and "metarepresentation"; "mentalese" and language acquisition; metaphor and "cognitive fluidity" or conceptual blending; "scripts" and "schemata"; and narrative as an elementary conceptual schema.
However, his rather automated performance during aphasia is evidence that we do think outside the boundaries of natural language and possess a "richer language of thought" that has been called by Steven Pinker "mentalese" (in contrast to "Portuguese") (Palmer 95).