"Past efforts to fight dispersed over wide areas (the Pentomic
Army of the late '50s and the Cold War Army in Europe) disclosed considerable problems of coordination and manning.
Army to an intriguing organizational innovation, and a Service-level response to the broader New Look: the Pentomic
Taylor, reorganized infantry and airborne formations into pentomic
Alas, with its "pentomic
" unit designs and various tactical nuclear rockets, the Army imperfectly solved the puzzle of the nuclear battlefield.
When the Army reorganized under the Pentomic
Division concept during the 1950s, the divisional signal companies expanded to become battalion-size elements.
Rigg's thinking reflected that of those in the Army who would eventually transform its organization from that of the Second World War and the follow-on Constabulary in Europe and Germany to the "Pentomic
Army," designed to fight and win on nuclear, as well as conventional, battlefields.
In March 1957, a year after its deployment to Germany, the 11th Airborne Division was organized under the "Pentomic
and South Korean military manpower and creating mobile "Pentomic
" army divisions, equipped with weapons giving them the dual capability of fighting either on an atomic or non-atomic battlefield, the JCS began to push the president to authorize the actual positioning of nuclear weapons in South Korea itself.
The so-called Pentomic
divisions of the early nuclear period, the ROAD (Reorganization Objective, Army Divisions) initiatives of the early 1960s, the Army of Excellence of the 1980s, and numerous other reform programs have been a regular occurrence in the Army since 1945.
In its place, the study recommended a small division of approximately 8,600 men organized into five small, self-sufficient battle groups--a pentomic
By 1956 it had deployed a "pentomic
" fighting unit that, the contributors to Atomic Audit believe, was "designed to justify the procurement of large numbers of new nuclear weapons rather than develop a workable concept for employing them in time of war." The result was ineffective deployment and decentralized control over nuclear weapons by commanders in the field, thus increasing "the risk of accidental or unintentional nuclear war."
Ground forces, trained on the principle of concentration of force, would find such concentrations to be excellent targets for mass annihilation and therefore would have to disperse to survive--hence the (ill-fated) Pentomic