we protend them--and we retend the notes that are no longer heard.
When we hear a melody, we will always protend further notes of the music.
When we protend a certain note in a melody, that note is not yet fulfilled (as Husserls says, the protention has a "not-yet" status).
In this case, we retain "I love" and we protend "you".
Protentions and their fulfllments likewise may link serially from moment to moment or may protend towards unities interpreted as events in themselves.
We might protend x event or object, but that will not generate a chain of further protentions that emanate from x, because x does not yet exist in the first place.
Unfortunately, Gallagher does not spell out his ideas much more; but there are three obvious ideas that we can conclude from his analysis: first, the content of our experiences affect our temporal structure--in particular, what we retain seems to constrain the objects that we will protend in the future.
When we notice that some things in particular are protended and some others are not (as when, for example, we protend notes x or y in a melody, but not notes a or b), the following question arises: what exactly motivates our interest or expectation in one particular thing over the other?