sensibilia


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sensibilia

(ˌsɛnsɪˈbɪlɪə)
pl n
those things which can be sensed
[Latin, neuter plural of sensibilis sensible]
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Finally, even though Aquinas at times differentiates fortitude from temperance, he also says, about humility, "omnes virtutes refrenantes sive reprimentes impetus aliquarum affectionum, vel actiones moderantes, ponuntur partes temperantiae" ["whatever virtues restrain or suppress, and the actions which moderate the impetuosity of the emotions, are reckoned parts of temperance"] (Summa 2.2.161.4.Respondeo); Jonah should have humbly suppressed the need to flee from "sensibilia et corporalia mala" ["sensible and bodily evils"], an instinct related to temperance (2.2.141.3.Respondeo).
(17.) Austin, Sense and Sensibilia, supra note 16, at 15-19.
Aristoteles usa o imperativo de terceira pessoa [phrase omitted] no inicio do De sensu et sensibilia para se referir ao que foi dito 'a respeito da alma' (16).
Austin's Sense and Sensibilia, (12) but to mention that his analysis has no ideological direction whatsoever.
(63) See, for example, his discussions in On the Soul 3.2.426b30-427a14 and Sense and Sensibilia 7.449a5-19.
After 5 lines beginning with "The," introducing nearly metaphorically the metonymic aspirations of the poem, its telling of "glories strung like beads on my smallest sights and hearings," the sixth line adumbrates the next anaphoric chain by starting "The others" and, after asserting a "tie" between temporally isolated others, the stanza ends with that very word "others" on the right margin only to have the poem "cross" the whitespace to find the same word waiting for it on the left, where it will, just like "The," serve as a formal device for introducing the available sites of percepts of place, what Bertrand Russell would later call "sensibilia," or "unsensed sense-data"; the anaphora will then model the substitutability of persons capable of pursuing those percepts.
They are "philosophical sensibilia, the perceptions and affections of fragmentary concepts themselves: through them concepts are not only thought but perceived and felt" (131).
To the degree that these habits are absent, and the delectationes of the body intemperately hold sway so that "the intention of the soul is attracted to inferior powers," (71) ab intelligibilia ad sensibilia, reason naturally "suffers defect," (72) is "maximally weakened," (73) and can even become "totally buried" (74) to the point that the soul loses authentic contact with the intelligible form and end of things.