(I'.2) questions whether commitment to S implies commitment to doing A, and (II'.2) questions whether the normative premise is a persuasive or stipulative definition. Therefore, both questions are necessary in evaluating arguments that have the form (A).
While their resistance to "neat categories" (which I take to mean non-overlapping categories) and "grand generalizations" is to be applauded, I can think of no reason why this resistance should have prevented them from providing a carefully delineated stipulative definition in this case.
The stipulative definition (see Table 1) explicitly recognises that one should pay attention only to testable (hence falsifiable) propositions of the form "if A then C" in order to build empirical generalisations (Braithwaite, 1955; Skinner, 1953).
In addition to these non-site, distributional survey techniques, relatively dense concentrations of artefacts (defined as `artefact scatters' using a stipulative definition) and other features of interest (stone sources, rockshelters with potential deposit and rock art locations) were recorded judgementally outside the probability sample.