substitutivity

substitutivity

(ˌsʌbstɪtjuːˈtɪvɪtɪ)
n
1. (Logic) logic philosophy the principle that expressions with the same reference can be substituted for one another without affecting the truth-value of any context in which they occur. See also transparent context, opaque context
2. (Philosophy) logic philosophy the principle that expressions with the same reference can be substituted for one another without affecting the truth-value of any context in which they occur. See also transparent context, opaque context
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problems with substitutivity, furnishing genuine explanations, etc.
An argument like the following can be given against the possibility of contingent identity statements: First, the law of the substitutivity of identity says that, for any objects x and y, if x is identical to y, then if x has a certain property F, so does y:
It explains this disparity between indicative and counterfactual conditionals by clarifying important logical differences between them: (a) substitutivity of identity holds for indicatives but fails for counterfactuals, and Co) counterfactuals preserve possibility while indicatives preserve only truth.
Boshernitzan and Caroll [8] have found a sufficient condition for substitutivity of an infinite word coding an exchange of r intervals.
2010) Component Simulation-based Substitutivity Managing QoS Aspects.
4) The Substitutivity Principle: If two expressions have the same meaning, then substitution of one for the other in a third expression does not change the meaning of the third expression.
It would seem that Kripke draws back from Millianism, since --for instance-- he is worried about the substitutivity of proper names in propositional attitude contexts.
The Substitutivity Requirement: a definiens must be substitutable salva veritate for its definiendum.
In this way, Dancy reveals Socrates' commitment to the following three assumptions about adequate definitions: 1) the substitutivity requirement that the definition of F-ness specify necessary and sufficient conditions for something's being F (81-2); 2) the paradigm requirement that the definition provide a model by which the applicability of 'F' can be determined (115), and 3) the explanatory requirement that the definition explain why F things count as F (135).
Scholars like Ishiguro, for example, have pointed out that the general understanding of 'Leibniz' law' aims to the Principle of Indiscernibility of Identicals, while the Principle of Substitutivity is a principle which defines identity of concepts.
246) Concerning the Smith/Jones example, however--in the context of the propositional attitudes--there is a failure of substitutivity of the seemingly coreferential terms Jones and a judge.