First: we can simply stipulate that a sentence with one LF--from an antecedently uninterpreted artificial language--has the same truth-condition
as an old sentence with some other LF.
The theses, M and TM, are not truth-condition
accounts of making and truth-making claims.
In this kind of semantics we can give the truth-condition
of any non-fundamental sentence solely in fundamental terms.
But this particular kind of meaning does not displace, subsume, or take precedence over, for instance, the `conscious, truth-condition
meaning of the average reader'.
Let's think of a truth-condition
for a sentence S is a condition C, that may or may not obtain, under which S is true.
Recanati states that a term is (type)-referential if and only if its linguistic meaning includes a feature, "call it 'REF', by virtue of which it indicates that the truth-condition
ii) is doubtless true of each red thing, but it does not give the truth-condition
of 'x is red'.
More specifically, given a conjunctive type-sentence, I will distinguish a static truth-condition
from a dynamic truth-condition
, and, based on this distinction, I will prescribe two notions of validity and two notion of contradiction.
He argues, with Grice, that while (i) is what is said by (3), and thus what determines its truth-condition
, not just (i), but also (ii) is part of (2)'s semantic content, "the content it possesses by virtue of linguistic rules and context, and upon which logical particles may potentially operate" (Barker 2003, p.
That is, it is sufficient for a remark, or the tokening of a sentence, to be thought of as possessing a truth-condition
that it has the syntax of an ordinary indicative sentence, and that there are (enough) norms governing its acceptance or rejection.
of a belief b is the condition with which it is the purpose of b to be 'co-present'.
On the other hand, (A) produces a correct truth-condition
of l in the form: