The central premises in the philosophy of language - that a speaker's understanding of a sentence must be fully "manifestable" in his behaviour; that what matters is manifestability "in principle" and not "in practice"; that a sentence cannot possess a certain truth-condition
unless a speaker's use of it can be said to be guided by a grasp of that condition, or more generally, the view that the psychological state that underlies a speaker's competent use of a sentence determines its semantic value - these have all been the subject of extensive critical discussion, especially in America where they are widely rejected.
Papineau anticipates such an objection, and his response emphasises the guarantee the truth-condition
gives that all tokens of the belief-type will fulfil its purpose (p.
However, the classical approach which holds both that to grasp a proposition is to know its truth-condition
and that every proposition is either true or false independently of our being able to tell which, is found to be "irredeemably circular", because it identifies grasping a proposition with having theoretical knowledge of its truth-condition
; which is tantamount to saying that to grasp a proposition is to grasp the proposition that says that it is true on such and such condition.
For Carnap, a semantical system is "a system of rules, formulated in a metalanguage and referring to an object language, of such a kind that the rules determine a truth-condition
for every sentence of the object language" (Carnap, 1942: 22).
In this kind of semantics we can give the truth-condition
of any non-fundamental sentence solely in fundamental terms.
) between word and object; rather, knowledge will be
But this particular kind of meaning does not displace, subsume, or take precedence over, for instance, the `conscious, truth-condition
meaning of the average reader'.
Recanati states that a term is (type)-referential if and only if its linguistic meaning includes a feature, "call it 'REF', by virtue of which it indicates that the truth-condition
[...] of the utterance where it occurs is singular." (3) As Recanati puts it, REF forces the hearer to interpret the utterance as representing a singular state of affairs with the reference of the referential term as a constituent.
(ii) is doubtless true of each red thing, but it does not give the truth-condition
of 'x is red'.
That is, it is sufficient for a remark, or the tokening of a sentence, to be thought of as possessing a truth-condition
that it has the syntax of an ordinary indicative sentence, and that there are (enough) norms governing its acceptance or rejection.(3)