truth-value gap

truth-value gap

n
(Logic) logic the possibility in certain semantic systems of a statement being neither true nor false while also not being determinately of any third truth-value, as all my children are asleep uttered by a childless person
Collins English Dictionary – Complete and Unabridged, 12th Edition 2014 © HarperCollins Publishers 1991, 1994, 1998, 2000, 2003, 2006, 2007, 2009, 2011, 2014
References in periodicals archive ?
Also, neither language has a 'truth-value gap' predicate, a formula that asserts that there is no winning strategy for either player.
Hart would claim there was a truth-value gap in the law prior to the decision.
Gurus of the truth-value gap are ontologically light-hearted about existential quantifiers.
In particular, the usual understanding of vagueness in terms of borderline cases, where the latter are thought of as truth-value gaps, begs the question against the subvaluational approach.
Tweedale, M.M., 2004, "Future Contingents and Deflated Truth-Value Gaps", Nous, vol.
So, they are susceptible to truth-value gaps. Is Federal Rule of Evidence 702 compatible or incompatible with the Frye test?
One of the few points of agreement to be found in mainstream responses to the logical and semantic problems generated by vagueness is the view that if any modification of classical logic and semantics is required at all then it will only be such as to admit underdetermined reference and truth-value gaps. Logics of vagueness including many-valued logics, fuzzy logics, and supervaluation logics all provide responses in accord with this view.
It is, we believe, a mistake to think of history-open sentences as introducing truth-value gaps that sometimes need to be filled by so-called supervaluations.
His attention has always been focused on regions of discourse whose statements are clearly "in the market" for truth and falsity but which nonetheless feature local truth-value gaps. When the sentences in an area are truth-apt in this way, it makes sense to speak of them as possessing a subject matter.
However, intuitions about future contingents cannot by themselves give good reasons for shifting to a new paradigm, for despite the initial appearances, standard non-relativistic semantics (plus an account of truth-value gaps) can accommodate both intuitions about future contingents.