neutralize the early-stage decision to challenge a comparable venireman
235, 24344 (1968) ("Challenges for cause, therefore, do not keep juries free from unconscious prejudice, from prejudice which the venireman
through embarrassment or otherwise is unwilling to admit publicly on voir dire, or from prejudice whose impact on his objectivity is greater than he knows." (footnote omitted)).
(145) For example, Congress could require that a single venireman
remain in the courtroom for every stage of the defendant's trial, thus effectively giving the defendant a "public" trial in the most disingenuous sense.
1988) ("Years after trial, the prosecutor cannot adequately reconstruct his reasons for striking a venireman
. Nor can the judge recall whether he believed a potential juror's statement that any alleged biases would not prevent him from being a fair and impartial juror.
(84) Consequently, the Clark opinion stands for the proposition that a venireman
's concealment of material information at voir dire can be a significant factor in a post-trial assessment of juror impartiality.
said he thought there should be caps on damages because of frivolous lawsuits.
The Court emphasized that Witt "instructed that, in applying this standard, reviewing courts are to accord deference to the trial court," (9) and "thus, where there is ambiguity in the prospective juror's statements, 'the trial court, aided as it undoubtedly [is] by its assessment of [the venireman
's] demeanor, [is] entitled to resolve it in favor of the state.'" (10) The Court further noted that the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) required similar deference.